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It has been my observatian that many who
are busy with hi story as their academi c profession seem opposed to Dooyeweerd's
approach to
history.
This maybe due in part to the fact that
they have not sufficiently
sought to understand
Dooyeweerd.
However, it seems to me that it is
more particularly
because what Dooyeweerd discusses as history is not the same as what the historians are discussing as history.
This is h"ue
quite specifically
when both begin to speak
about "law" in history, or when they begin to
ask, Can one posit some specific laws for history?
When an historian attempts to locate some
laws for history,
he generally
looks to the past
to see if any pattern has emerged which he can
expect to repeat itself in the future 'Nith such
regularity that he can depend on it and can use
it to make predictions.
This is the basis for law
in the so-called "exact"
sciences such as physics

department.

and chemi stry. Noti ng that there is not that kind
ofregularity of pattern in history and conc luding
that history does not repeat itself, many students
of history conclude that we have to abandon the
idea of law in history and that we have to therewith abandon the idea that history is a science,
at least in the narrower sense which is required
by the demands of prediction expected and obtained in the "exact" or positive sciences.
Failing to find any predictive basis for the
future in the study of past events, at least for
exact prediction, the Christian historian turns to
the Scriptures and makes somestatements which
he believes are valid on the basis of the creditability of the Scriptures themselves. He knows
that God is a covenant-keepi ng God. He knows
and expects some kinds of conclusions on the
basis of sacred history. God wi II not go back
on his promises to his people. Christ will return
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in due time and there will be a judgment and a
subsequent separation of the "City of God" and
the "City of the World." There is an antithesis
which runs through history, though it is not man's
business to sort out the sheep from the goats in
the process of time. Beyond some of these broad
outlines, the historian in the Reformed and Amillenial position does not attempt to delineate the
future with a fi ne-poi nted pen. He is satisfied
with a Biblical eschatology broadly construed.
For Dooyeweerd (if I understand him correctly) laws for history along with every other
law in creation are imbedded in the total scheme
of Cosmonomic Law, which is the touchstone of
Dooyeweerd's phi losophy. Dooyeweerd insists
that the Bible does not provide us with phi losophical ideas, anymore than it gives us natural scientific knowledge or economic or legal theory.
But the "states of affairs" presenting themselves
within the temporal order of our experience are
of a dynamic meaning-character, that is, they
refer outside and above themselves to the universal meaning-context in time, to the creaturely
unity of root and to the absolute Origin of all
meani ng.1 (Origi n here refers to God as Creator.)

II

Dooyeweerdinsiststhat the

Bible does not provide us
with philosophical ideas,
anymore than it gives us natural scientific knowledge or
economic or legal theory. II

Dooyeweerd cautions us against coming to
hasty conclusions in our theoretic explanation of
the "states of affairs" as we experience them and
try to explain them. He suggests, "I consider
it a critical requirement to suspend our phi losophical interpretation of the 'states of affairs' at
issue unti I we have so many of them at our disposal, relating to all the modal aspects of our
temporal experiential world which until now we
have learned to distinguish, that we can try to
conceive them in a philosophical total view. ,,2

In elaborating his position Dooyeweerd
enumerates a vari ety of modes or aspects of experience. Each of these exhibits its own laws
and is sovereign in its own sphere. These aspects
or modalities include number, space, energy,
motion, life, feeling, analysis, history, language, the social, economics, aesthetics, law
(jurisprudence), ethics, and pistics (faith). Each
modality anticipates the one above it in the
scale, and each above has a reciproclJl relation
to the ones which precede it. Created entities
also participate in these ~pects as acting subjectsaccording totheir complexity.
Man is an
acting subject in all aspects from the numerical
to the pistical (faith) aspect.
Those who are acquainted with Kant's
"forms of intuition" and "categories of thought"
will recognize some similarities between what
Kant was tryi ng to do and what Dooyeweerd has
done. There is, however, this basic distinction:
Kant suggested that man created "reality" for
himself by the use of the forms of intuition and
the categori es of thought, whi Ie Dooyeweerd
insists that these modalities are inherent in the
order of creation and have norms which are not
amenable to subjective manipulation.
In fact,
it is this inherent objectivity
which makes it
possible for the Christian and the non-Christian
to say similar things about shared "states of
affairs." While granting the non-manipulatory
nature of the various modal aspects, one might
argue against Dooyeweerd by suggesting that
everyone approaches the common "states of
affairs" with a particular religious bias which
wi II distort the conc lusions reached concerning
the "states of affairs. ,,3
Students of Kant wi II also have noticed
that ~is
missing in the above listing of the
modal aspects of reality. Where does it fit in?
For Dooyeweerd, "cosmic time overarches the
different aspects as order, and streams through
their boundaries as duration. ,,4 The continuity
of time is not exhausted by any single specific
aspect of meaning. Therefore, this continuity
cannot be comprehended in any concept but can
only be approximately apprehended in a transcendenta I Idea. Here DooyeweerdapparentIy
takes his cue from Henri Bergson who argued
that concepts artificially
cut up time like a
series of photographi c slides that do not give us
the feeling of duration or action which is pos-

.8-

sib Ie with the movi e camera. This approach to
time by Dooyeweerd not only approximates
Bergson's Intuitionism but also forms part of
Dooyeweerd's objections to conceptionalization of revelation when he argues that to think of
Biblical revelation in conceptual terms is to
lapse into rationalism.
For Dooyeweerd, nothing created is selfsufficient.
Everything points beyond itself to
the other aspects of reality.
God alone gives
meaning to the parts and to the whole. Dooyeweerd so emphasizes this concept that he refuses.
to give the status of being to any created entities. They stand only as "meaning" in relation
to God as Being. God is the Transcendent, the
source of all creation. He is the transcendent
CIpriori of all philosophical or scientific activity. But forming a counterpart of this view is
the strategic assumption that God operates
through cosmic time and that the fulness of
meaning of creation is refracted by time's limitationsin much the same way that white light
is refracted by a prism into a spectrum of color.5
Those who are critical of Dooyeweerd at
various points, including myself, feel that in
his notion of time Dooyeweerd is assigning to

up time into discernable and separately experienced entities of duration. Dooyeweerd seems
to have a feeling for this cutting up of time
when he says, "If I hasten to my work and look
at my watch, then time has for me not only an
abstract aspect of movement, but I experience
it in the conti nuous coherence of its aspects
of number, space and movement, with the
stream of organic life, duration of feeling and
the normative social aspects.,,6
From the last four paragraphs we should
be ready to conclude that time is not of the
essence when it comes to Dooyeweerd's view
of the laws of history. To be sure, what goes
on "historically"
will happen under the overarching canopy of cosmic time; but history wi II
not be a record of past events in time, but will
fit into the modality structure as indicated
above. It stands between the ana Iyti c and
the lingual aspects of man's experience of
those modes of the created order. To get at
the idea of history, we must now move on to
discover the nuclear moment or the identifying
characteristic of the historical modality. Each
modality has such a nuclear moment or identifying characteristic,
according to Dooye-

it a function which it does not perform. In
fact, it is my opi nion that he has the process
reversed. Instead of time refracting the ordered
creation into distinguishable entities, it is the
various experiences of the various aspects that
break up the duration of time which otherwise
would'be like an indistinguishable flow.
Van Riessen, also a professor at the Free
University, fee Is that the experience of the
physical breaks up time. Stoker of the University of Potchefstroom, South Afri co, suggests
that it is the succession of events that breaks

weerd.

This distinguishes it from every other
sphere, gives it its sovereign rights, and places
it in its order amongst the modalities or aspects.
We are now at the point where the basic
confusion
arises between Dooyeweerd's
idea
of history and the more generally
accepted
ideas of history, both secular and Christian.
The confusion arises because, to my mind,
Dooyeweerd at this point plays semantic tricks
on us that he should have anticipated
and
avoided.
The nuclear moment or basic characteristic
afthe historical
modality is distin_0-

beyond history for the meaning of events, but it
is not true that anyone who does not limit the
concept of history to the confines of Dooyeweerd's historical modality by so much denies that
there is a transcendent context for history, whi ch
context can be the Creator God of the Scriptures.
In other words, history does not have to be fitted
into the Cosmonomic Law scheme in a modality
structure in order finallyor perhaps more immediatelyto relate for meaning to its Origin, to use
Dooyeweerd's term for Creator.

guished from other kinds of formi ng as, for example, the spider making a web which it does by
instinct.
Because man has analytical abilities,
he alone has cultural abi lities. Dooyeweerd suggests that the cultural mode of formation reveals
itself in two directions which are closely connected with each other. On the one hand, it is
a formative power over persons unfolding itself
by giving cultural form to their social existence;
on the other, it appears as a controlling manner
of sharing natural things or materials to cultural
ends.?

Thedi fference in vi ewpoints between Dooy-

I'ln other words, history does not have to be fitted into the Cosmonomic Law scheme in a modality structure in order finally or perhaps
more immediately to relate for meaning to its Origin, to use Dooyeweerd's term for Creator. II

The historical aspect is only one of these
fundamental modes of experience, and, like the
others, it does not refer to a concrete "what,"
that is, to concrete events of temporal reality,
but it refers to the moda I "how," the manner in
which they are experienced in their ~ent
aspects. The aspects are theoreti c abstractions.
It seems to me that the historical modality is an
abstraction twice removed from the concrete, so
much so that it almost turns out to be a vacuous
concept. When one considers the act of controlled forming, one is tempted to ask, What is
the forming concerned~?
Then it turns out
that one has to turn to the other moda I iti es to fi nd
the answer. One can be busy with forming in the
political sphere as indicated above in the reference which mentions giving cultural form tosocia! existence.
Dooyeweerd's narrower concept of the "historical" becomes particularly apparent when he
labels as "historicists" those historians who want
to include all human activity as it happened in
the province of history. These men, according
to Dooyeweerd, are elevating the historical to
a position which gives it precedence over the
other modalities and would determine their meaningmerelyonthebasisofhistoryitself.
!tis true,
of course, that the "historicist" does not look

eweerd and others comes out perhaps most strikingly when we begin to consider laws for history.
As was suggested, most historians look for laws
in terms of patterns emerg i ng from the happen i ngs
of the past. For Dooyeweerd, laws for history
are "oughts" which should control the direction
of our cultural-formative
activity.
This obligation has been inherent in creation but was
specifically fortified by the cultural mandate as
found in Genesis 1:28, "Be fruitful and multiply,
and subdue the earth..."
Dooyeweerd's abstract
limitation of the formative aspect would almost
limit the reading to "subdue" without illdicating
anything to subdue. Be that as it may, the laws
forthe historical modality read more like ethical
directives than conclusions extracted from an
empirical and critical study of the past.
The norms which Dooyeweerd would impose
for the use of man's formative power are as follows:
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1. Continuity
This can be presumed to be a law
for all constructive activity; but when
giving an illustration, Dooyeweerd refers to man's political activity.
It IS
impossible, for example, in the interest
of wiping out the evils of past regimes
to begin with a new calendar, as the
French presumed to do after destroying

lIThe Israelites wanted to
'differentiate'
out the office of king after the man-

the simple and unified become more
complex and differentiated.
Differentiation brings about the kind of development which presently separates
out such institutions as home, school,
church, and state. In a "closed" society, these were often under one head.
Abraham's cultural stage of developmentcouldbe used as an illustration
of an undifferentiated
one. To his
househo Id, Abraham was prophet, pri est,
and king, even though he had no familyover which he would hold that position as father. He had the church in his
household and he was its political head.
He ruled over a sma! I nation-state, as
is evident by the fact that he was able
to mustera small but effective fighting
force in pursuit of Chedorlaomer when
Abraham rescued Lot.
According to the norm for the formative "historical" modality, Abraham's
si tuation was non-normative. It needed
"opening up."
The various cultural
potentialities had to be more fully developed. As society develops, itshould
become more differentiated,
so that
prophet, priest, and king have their

Canaanites

the

of

Historical'development'

ner

2

separate provinces of activity, and the
one does not encroach on the other.
If one follows this line of thinking,
then an interesting anomaly is presented
in the case of the Hebrews' choosing a
king at the ti me that SamueI was servi ng
the ostensibly triple role of prophet,
priest, and king. The Israelites wanted
to "differentiate" out the office of ki ng
after the manner of the Canaanites. In
so doing, they were showing signs of
apostasy as they were accused ofrejectingnot Samuel, but God as their King.
Historical "develop~"
is here disobedience and rebellion against God.

the monarchy.
We may note here that in illustration Dooyeweerd uses an example from
the area of the juridical aspect of his
scheme, indicating that forming as such
needs a reference beyond itse If. Further, we should also note that continuity
is not in any waya norm that is peculiar
to the historical in Dooyeweerd's limited sense. Continuity,
applies, for
example, to the aesthetic as well, or
to any other aspect, for that matter, as
it ts a law of all existence.
In the
aesthetic, by way of illustration,
we
can suggest that the artist violates the
lawofcontinuitywhenhe
tries to be so
innovative that no one understands what
he is doing.
Differentiation
This norm points in the direction
of specialization and division of tasks
in roc iety. Dooyeweerd often uses the
idea of "opening-up process, " whereby

is

heredisobedience and rebellion against God.'1

3

Integration
This suggeststhe need of organizationofthe individual specializations in
such a way that large-scale cultural
operations can be carried on efficiently.
The coordination needed to bring about
a moonshot or a skylab experiment VIOuld
be a modern example. When one, in
a reacti onary way, wants to prevent
this kind of integrative activity, he is
(according to Dooyeweerd) acting unhistorically.
Again, we call attention
to the fact that the integration always
goes on in some area covered by the
other modalities.
It always occurs in
the areas of technical, economic, social, and political activity.
Reactionary forces are a Iso directed against this
kind of integration (Cf. John Van Dyk,
I'Culturallntegration,

II Medieval

!fu.-

!.Q!.'i,Part I, p. 13, Dordt Collegeprinting).
It is interesting to notice that the
laws of differentiation and integration
were already suggested by Herbert
Spencer, the English evolutionist.
This
need not bother us, for we can readily
admit that it does not take the Christian perspective to understand that

4.

highly complex developments require
highly complex organizations or "integrations." The question of direction is
another matter, however. It took a good
bit of organization to build the tower
of Babel, but the intention of the work
was manifestly apostate. Many have
argued that ethically there are priorities which take precedence over such
integrative activities as our moonshots.
Dooyeweerd, of course, would not insist
that the law of integration stands in
dissociation from the Scriptural mandate of love.
Individual i zation
This norm applies both to groups
and to individuals.
Since the time of
the Renaissance, the individual has received a great deal of attention.
Individualism ran out into apostasy as it
reacted to the communal impositions
which had been part of the earlier
church-dominated
Christendom.
In
America it ran out into a "rugged individualism," which is equal Iy apostate.
In the context of the Scriptures and the
Christian life, the idea suggests that
the individual should be able to make
his own decisions in the areas of personal freedom on the basis of his own
conscience as he stands before God and
His law.
Dooyeweerd suggests that as an
impediment to individualization
modern totalitarian
political systems attempt to annihilate the process of differentiation and individualization
by a
methodicalprocessofmentale~alizing
of all the cultural spheres, thereby implying a fundamental denial of the
value of the individual persanalit~ in
the opening-up process of history.

Some General Criticisms

The Method of TranscendentalCritique
By looking at the common "states of affairs"
and finding a place for some common dialogue
with the non-Christian without first insisting that
all recognize the Origin of all meaning, it would
seem that Dooyeweerd is giving away more in his
method at the outset than he should. He may
insist that no one can say anything "subjectively"
about the common "states of affairs, " because all
stand in the creation order and must be assumed
to have meaning for that reason. But surely one
must admit that the non-Christian does not recognize that context of meaning, so he can only make
statements that assumehis non-Christian apostasy.
I would prefer to ~
with the Origin (God) and
then begin to talk about the common "states of
affairs. " It is only on that condition that one
should be allowed to claim meaningful statements.
As Dooyeweerd himselfwould have to admit, the
only alternative is to start a dialogue on the assumptionthat some immanent principle or aspect
of creation such as man's reason could be used as
a common poi nt of reference.

View of the Kin~dom
If we take Dooyeweerd's transcendental
method and add to that his cultural norms, in and
by themselves there is really nomarkby which to
distinguish his approach from the patterns set by
those who limit themselves to the "social gospel"
viewofthekingdom
and/or those who with Spencer would proceed on the basis of evolutionary
naturalism and its assumptions. Dooyeweerd
would not take the historical norms out of the religious ground motive which he established for
them by assuming a transcendent a priori (Creator)
as the basis for the whole of cosmonomic law.
There is, however, the danger that the Origin is
obscured. As has been illustrated earlier, we
cannot think about any norm~,
for they are
always religiously qualified.
We face another danger with Dooyeweerd's
norms. We may be tempted to make the working
out of these norms to be a kind of preconceived
end as the necessary precondition to the coming
of God's Ki ngdom or as that part of the Ki ngdom
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whi ch must arrive before Chri st can return. It
appearsthat John 0 Ithui s is on the verge of that
kind of thinking with his visions of 1980 as he
delineates them in Out of Concern for the

~.

9 There he envisions a Christian daily

newspaper available on the stands and theater
marquees aglow, spelling out the titles of the
latest Christian films. That and more. It seems
to methatthis hope closely approximates a kind
of neo-postmillenialism which is foreign to the
Reformed tradition and is without Biblical warrant.

We shou1dadd at this point that the spinoff
of ideaswhich the disciples are able to "centrifugate" fromthe ideasof the masterare not always
in keeping with the intention of the original.
Dooyeweerd te II s us not to expect too much by
way of perfecting the Kingdomhereand now becauseof the continued countervailing effects of
sin which are ever present and potent.1O
The AmbiQulty of Continuity
Continuity would seem to be so obvious a
law of history that it cannot be denied in either

"For the Christian, continuity would have to include such naturally discontinuous events as the
virgin birth, the resurrection, and the ascension of
Christ."

a common senseorscientificviewof
history. But
in the secular mind, continuity is based on the
idea of positive lawsthatallowfor
some measure
ofprediction.
With a uniformitarian approach to
the past, the secular scientist assumes that what
is now, must al ways have been. Thus, events
which do not now happen could not have happened in earlier history. The secular historian
usesthis test to throw out as impossible or unreliableanyeventswhichdonotfit
his prescription
forvalideventsatpresent.
This kind of thinking
will control the secular view of continuity.

So it turns out that if we want to use the
norm of continuity as one of the laws of history,
we cannot use it in the same sense that the secular historian uses it and cannot limit it by his
lilJ1itations. For the Christian, continuity can
only be posited as a law of history within the
context of sacred history and its emphasis on God's
Covenant of Grace. This makes it necessary for
our concept of "continuity" to be stipulated in
such a way that the secular historian would not
be willing to ucl:.o::pr:i. Cui' i:!ea of conti!1uity
wou Id have to allow for events which were not
continuous with the cause-and-effect relationships which the secular historian posits on the
basis of his ideas of natural law. For the Christian, continuity would have to include such
naturally discontinuous events as the virgin birth,
the resurrection, and the ascension of Christ.
These events would also fall outside of any
"common states of affairs" that the non-Christian
might be willing to share with us.
We could use an example which might not
come quite so readily within the classification of
the miraculous as the above-mentioned events
associated with the Incarnation.
Take the case
of Noah. By all the known normsof continuity,
Noah would have had no reason to expect a flood.
His countrymen surely must have doubted his
sanity when they judged him by their norm of
continuity.
But Noah went ahead because he
had had an intervening word from his covenantkeeping God. He went ahead in spite of all lack
of historical-critical
evidence. No wonder that
Noah is I isted as a hero of faith. He went ahead
in spite of the scholars of his day who would make
the word which Noah had received subject to the
scrutiny of the historical-critical
method in order
to validate its authority.
Noah accepted the
once-spoken, i n-itse If-authority of his covenant
God and staked his life on it. We might add that
modern Bible-believing Christians can well follow Noah's example. It might eliminate some of
the complexities we insert into our hermeneutics.
History and Natural Law
Those who take the law side of the Dooyeweerdian modality scheme and make it the paridigm for their view of creation often do so out of
the conviction
that this scheme is God's Word
for Creation.
They often speak of the process in
terms of three divisions:
Creator,
Law for crea-
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tion, and the resu Iting creation.. They do this in
order to get away from the natural law idea which
grew out of Greek phi losophy and which remained
in Scholastic philosophy and theology to cut up
realityand meaning into the categories of Nature
and Grace. Nature, in the Scholastic scheme,
has its own laws, which are the common ground
for non-Christian and Christian activity without
any presuppositions of basic difference.
Those who work out of this Dooyeweerdian
structure also want to eliminate such distinctions
as "natural" and "supernatural" as doing violence
to Biblical concepts of providence. All events
happen accmding to God's Law for creation, so
£!J is miracle or nothing is miracle, and there is
no point in speaking about "special providence"
over against general providence.
Whi Ie one can say that in a sense the above
argumenrsare cogent, we again run into problems
of communication and meaning. It does no good
to try to argue someone out of the term miracle
when somehow or other it is common practice to

of a Nature-Grace dichotomy wherein the work
of Christ is relegated to the realm of grace. His
work does not sufficiently touch the whole of
creation. It also then failsto permeate the natural in such a way as to fulfill the cultural mandate and allow for the building of the Kingdom
here and now. It is too reminiscent of a pie-inthe-sky theology.
While I would agree that we should not limit
Christ's saving work to "soul saving" and in.th.9!
respect make history His Story, neverthe less, we
must be open to the Divine Plan of salvation as
informing and dominating the whole course of
hi story. By refusing to renovate their notion of
continuity to make room for a Divine Plan in and
for history, the Neo-Orthodox have had to make
room for two kinds of events, those which can
happen according to the ordinary laws of continuity and then the myths of religion which do
not occur in ordinary history but need a new
designation, namely, "Geschichte."
Dooyeweerd has come close to falling into

distinguish such happenings as flaating axe heads
from'sinkingones, a distinction which the Scriptures also recognize.
It seems to me that the
Christian can perfectly well continue to use such
distinctions without being under suspicion of
taking a kind of deistic approach to natural law
which would remove God from the ongoing existence of His Creation.

the Neo-Orthodox trap by denying that his modal
structure can be used to comprehend the eternal.
Hedenies that one can conceptualize the meanings of the Word-revelation.
He maintains that
the human ego is also of a super-modal nature,
so that it cannot be comprehended in theoretic
thought. The human ego is caught up in the supratemporal. This super-temporal experience is
found at the re lig ious center of our exi stence.
Now it turns out that because of a route
laid out by his own system, Dooyeweerd is confronted with the same stumbling block which
faced the Neo-Orthodox.
He must allow to
events of the Scriptural account historical status
in ordinary time along with ordinary day-to-day
events, or he must find a different category for
some events. Dooyeweerd chooses the latter
course. By having man participate in the tem-

History and Divine Plan
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Those who followthe Dooyeweerdian notion
of historical norms, are uncomfortable with the
idea that history is His story. The latter emphasis
seems to work against the idea that ~
is the
history maker and that the process is a process of
fulfilling the norms for cultural forming. Again,
for the follower of Dooyeweerd, "Hisstory"smacks

poral and the supra-temporal, he must make some
kind of distinction which resembles Kant's noumenal (spirit) world as separated from the phenomenal (scientific, thing) world. Kant found
in man an empirical ego to deal with the latter
and a transcendenta I ego to dea I with the former.
Dooyeweerd does this, at least in part, by creating too great a gap between man's naive experience and his scientific activity, that is, his
theoretic thought.
As to sacred history, Dooyeweerd makes a
forthright choice. He states, "In this eschatological aspect of time, faith groups (places)the
"eschaton" and, in general, that which is or
happens beyond the limits of cosmic time. In
this special senseare to be understood the 'days
of creation', the initial words in the book of
Genesis, the order in which reqeneration precedes conversion, etc
I cannot agree with
the tendency of some modern Christian theologians who identify the eschatological aspect of
time with the historical and reject the supratemporal central sphery of human existence and
of divine revelation."
1

In summary, I would draw the following
conclusions: (1) When Dooyeweerd uses the
word history and refers to laws of history, he is
not referri ng to the same ideas that are ordinari Iy
understood by the terms. (2) Dooyeweerd's law
of continuity cannot be taken in a univocal sense
along with any secular definition of the term. If
we don't give it Christian meanings, it will cut
out the history of salvation as given by the Scriptures. (3) While breathing anathemas on all past
dualisms, Dooyeweerd has created a new dualism
of his own by placing man both in the temporal
and the supra-temporal order. This dua lism has
al I the weaknesses of Kant's dualism between the
noumenal (thought and spirit) world and the'phenomenal (science and thing) world. (4) Dooyeweerd's overly neat Cosmonomic encyclopedia
(arrangement of modalities, etc.), along with his
distinctions concerning time, compromiSes and

complicates without warrant the Biblical teachings concerning the relationship between the
world and the Word.
So, while we hailed Dooyeweerdasa knight
in shining armoras hedid battle with immanentistic philosophies, armed as he was with a belief
in the Creation, the Fall, and Redemption, we
find his own philosophic forays sometimessomewhatquixotic. Having said that, we should also
say to his credit that Dooyeweerd ventured out
beyondthe safety of the old traditions on "searchand-destroy" missions. Mostof ushavesat safely
behind the redoubts of the old castle of traditionalism sharpening lance points with bits of
rationalism, hoping in that way to make our
weaponssharper than thoseof the enemy though
cast from the samemetaI .
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